What do Bangladeshis expect from India? Ahead of elections, both sides must change

The Indian Express
Prof. Syed Munir Khasru
December 19, 2025

https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/bangladesh-india-muhammad-yunus-sheikh-hasina-awami-league-bnp-10428603/
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For India, the way forward is avoiding either endorsement or disapproval, engaging across the political spectrum, and clearly signalling readiness to work with whichever government emerges from a credible vote.

India-Bangladesh relations remain among the most consequential in South Asia, anchored in geography, trade, connectivity, energy cooperation and shared security interests. Few bilateral relationships in the region are as dense or as strategically intertwined. That depth gives India, the bigger of the two in almost every sense, a unique ability to influence outcomes in Bangladesh. But it also imposes corresponding responsibilities. It is precisely because of this importance that Bangladesh’s forthcoming election on February 12, 2026, has sharpened scrutiny of India’s political posture in Dhaka.

Over the past one-and-a-half decades, India’s responses to Bangladeshi elections, particularly during periods of contested legitimacy, have left a lasting imprint on public opinion in Dhaka that New Delhi’s engagement has been tilted toward a single political force — the then-ruling Awami League led by the deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. That imprint now frames both expectations and apprehensions as Bangladesh approaches the next polls under a caretaker government headed by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus.

During Hasina’s tenure, a succession of national elections were widely criticised for being non-participative and rigged. India’s public posture toward these polls remains a defining reference point in Bangladeshi political debate. The perceived endorsement of these elections did not go well with people deprived of their political voice. A snapshot of India’s official stance on the three controversial elections: (i) January 5, 2014: “It is for the people of Bangladesh to decide their own future.” (ii) December 6, 2018: “We view the elections as an internal affair of Bangladesh.” (iii) January 5, 2024: “[The] Election is the domestic affair of Bangladesh.” Now, the MEA’s statement on December 14 — supporting “free, fair, inclusive and credible elections in Bangladesh” — does not have much buy-in in Dhaka, particularly for the generation that could not exercise their right to vote in the last three elections.

The perception was further reinforced by the blurring of lines between state-to-state relations and state-to-party bonhomie as India’s engagement became closely associated with the Awami League leadership. Following the Monsoon Revolution in 2024, that association turned into a liability. Public scepticism intensified after Hasina sought refuge in India following her resignation. The symbolism of the move reinforced the belief that Delhi had become too invested in a particular political arrangement to appreciate the domestic transition that was underway.

Narratives by a significant portion of the Indian media did not help. Political attacks were frequently reframed as communal violence. By contrast, during Durga Puja, Yunus and army chief General Waker-uz-Zaman visited Hindu temples and assured minorities of state protection — gestures of reassurance that many Bangladeshis believe have no clear parallel in India, in terms of the latter’s religious minority.

On the other hand, India’s caution toward the Awami League’s main rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has historical roots. During the BNP-led government from 2001 to 2006, bilateral relations reached their nadir. Delhi’s security concerns and political mistrust resulted from the BNP’s inept handling of bilateral relations. This strengthened India’s preference for the Awami League as a reliable partner. However, that approach no longer fits a Bangladesh where the political costs of putting all the eggs in one basket are clear.

During Hasina’s rule, Bangladesh experienced sustained economic expansion and deeper regional integration, much of it anchored in cooperation with India. Bilateral trade reached $13.46 billion in FY 2024-25, making Bangladesh India’s largest trading partner in South Asia. Energy cooperation also expanded with over 2,000 megawatts of electricity from India, valued at approximately $1.08 billion in 2024.

Yet the political proximity did not resolve several long-standing bilateral disputes. Border killings continued. The Teesta water-sharing agreement remained unresolved despite more than a decade of negotiations and periods of exceptional diplomatic warmth. These unresolved issues illustrated the limits of political alignment and weakened public confidence in the assumption that proximity between the powerful can, by itself, deliver national interest outcomes.

As Bangladesh approaches its next election, India remains an indispensable partner in trade, connectivity, energy, and regional stability. At the same time, there is apprehension in Bangladesh about how India will conduct itself vis-à-vis the electoral process. For India, the way forward is avoiding either endorsement or disapproval, engaging across the political spectrum, and clearly signalling readiness to work with whichever government emerges from a credible vote. It also means recognising that legitimacy, once questioned, cannot be restored through economic cooperation alone.

India’s External Affairs Minister has stated that New Delhi seeks constructive relations with all political actors in Bangladesh. The principle is widely welcomed. Its credibility, however, will be determined by practice. Post elections, whoever comes to power in Bangladesh should reciprocate with the same openness.